A characteristic often associated with strong corporate governance is the co-location of shares' vo ting and cash-flow rights. However, the institutional and regulatory environment in which shareholder voting occurs can dislocate these rights, perhaps affecting voting outcomes.
In this paper, we examine the impact on shareholder voting of the so-called "broker vote," which is one feature of the institutional landscape that may dislocate voting rights. State and federal securities laws and the rules of the securities exchanges classify management proposals that are included on proxy ballots as either "routine" or "nonroutine." If management proposals are classified as routine, brokers may vote shares held in "street name" if investors fail to vote their shares; that is, there is a broker vote. However, if management proposals are classified as nonroutine, brokers cannot vote street name shares and firms report a "broker nonvote." To the extent that brokers vote shares for which they do not own cash-flow rights, voting and cash-flow rights are dislocated. Managers, thus, may have incentives to craft proposals so they are classified as routine rather than non-routine to influence voting outcomes.
Other features of the environment may also influence shareholder voting. Institutional investors' reliance on common sources of voting information and proxy analysis may concentrate their votes. We explore the effect of recommendations by the leading shareholder advisory service on voting results. We also examine the relations between shareholder voting and the corporate use of firms that solicit shareholder votes, share ownership structure, and other firm characteristics.
We analyze the impact of these features on shareholder voting and proposal passage for a broad set of proposals of Standard & Poor's Super-Composite 1,500 companies during the 1998 proxy season. The S&P Super-Composite 1,500 includes firms in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 Indexes. By focusing on these proposals, we explore the impact on shareholder voting and proposal passage of certain features of firms' institutional and regulatory environment that could not otherwise be studied. We find that in a number of instances, state and federal securities laws and the rules of the securities exchanges that govern the voting of shares held by brokers in street name affected shareholder voting and proposal passage. Routine management proposals received, on average, 8% more votes favorable to management than nonroutine proposals and 10.3% higher voting turnout. The passage of as many as 73 routine proposals in 1998 may have been swung because they were classified as routine, rather than nonroutine, proposals.
We note that the term "routine" is unfortunate, because it may connote "unimportant." This is not the case. Routine proposals can include authorizations of additional common equity and approvals of stock-option plans that increasingly are controversial. For proposals that sought the authorization of additional common equity and whose passage was likely swung by broker votes in 1998, we find the median proposed increase in authorized common exceeded 200% of current shares outstanding. For proposals seeking the adoption or addition of shares to stockoption plans whose passage was likely swung by broker votes, total dilution averaged 19.6%.
From the perspective of many shareholders, these proposals could have significantly diluted their voting power and perhaps wealth. Although our ability to directly measure harm to shareholders from broker votes is limited, we find evidence suggesting many of the swung proposals may not have been in investors' interests. Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the leading shareholder-voting advisory firm, recommended that shareholders vote against 78.1% of the proposals we estimate to have been swung by broker votes.
The original reason for permitting brokers to vote uninstructed shares held in street name was to ensure companies could meet quorum requirements, generally set at 50% of the eligible votes, for shareholder meetings. Although turnout may once have been an issue, we find that voting turnout for routine management proposals in 1998 averaged between 86.2% and 88.7%, depending on proposal type. If brokers had not been permitted to vote uninstructed shares, we estimate that voting turnout would have been between 71.4% and 83.8%. At these levels, few firms would have required broker votes to meet quorum requirements.
We also document the impact of ISS voting advice on shareholder voting. Notably, we find that ISS recommendations unfavorable to management were associated with 13.6% to 20.6% fewer votes cast in favor of management, depending on proposal type. Voting results also were related to the corporate use of proxy solicitors, share ownership structure, and other firm characteristics, including size and share turnover.
In general, the results highlight important determinants of the balance of power between managers and shareholders in the proxy process. We find that state and federal securities laws and the regulations of the securities exchanges can shift the balance of voting power and exacerbate the dispersion of voting and cash-flow rights. The corollary is that not all votes may have an equal impact on firm governance. Thus, the paper's findings have implications for securities regulators who often base rules regarding shareholder influence on simple proportions of shares outstanding, and for studies of ownership structure and corporate control that model voting power as such.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we examine the role of shareholders in corporate governance. Section II describes the institutional and regulatory environment in which shareholder voting occurs. Section III discusses factors that may affect shareholder voting.
Section IV describes the sample. Section V presents the results of univariate and multivariate analyses. Section VI concludes the paper.
I. Role of Shareholders in Corporate Governance
Past research has shown that the interests of managers can diverge from those of investors. Shareholders may moderate managers' pursuit of their own interests by voting on issues included in proxy statements and by voting on control events Fischel, 1983 and Pound, 1991) . Shareholders' ability to monitor and affect corporate policy, however, may be restricted. Managers control many of the issues included on ballots, which may undermine shareholder oversight (Berle and Means, 1932) . In addition, diffuse corporate ownership, which can create free-rider problems and lower the likelihood that a particular vote is pivotal in an election, may reduce shareholders' incentives to vote, thereby causing them to cede control to managers (Berle and Means, 1932) .
Numerous scholars, however, have challenged these views. For example, Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) contend that shareholders have sufficient power to affect events such as takeovers and proxy contests as long as can vote on key issues. They argue that shareholder involvement beyond this point can create inefficiencies, thus imposing transaction costs on firms and mitigating the benefits of delegating corporate decision-making to managers. Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) also argue that shareholders receive a fair deal in expectation: Investors who purchase a firm's initial shares consent to the control contract, and subsequent investors pay for shares in amounts consistent with shares' control rights. However, these arguments ignore the agency costs and losses in corporate wealth that may result if managers override shareholders'
preferences. The arguments also overlook the potential impact of changes in firms' institutional and regulatory environment on shares' control rights.
Recent empirical research on voting emphasizes shareholder proposals (e.g., Campbell, Gillan, and Niden, 1999; Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling, 1996) . Although this work contributes to our understanding of shareholder activism, it does not inform us of how the institutional and regulatory environment affects shareholder voting and the passage of management proposals.
Empirical research on management proposals centers largely on charter amendments and antitakeover measures during the mid-1980s and their effect on shareholders' wealth (e.g., Bhagat and Jefferis, 1991; Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1994; Pound, 1989; Young, Millar, and Glezen, 1993) . Companies' governance, voting, and regulatory environments have changed dramatically, however, with the rise of shareholder activism during the 1990s and substantive revisions to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) proxy rules in 1992 and 1998 (Gillan and Starks, 1998) . In addition, charter amendments and antitakeover measure proposals are always classified as nonroutine, and so we cannot investigate the impact of proposal classification in these instances.
More recent research on management proposals examines stock-option plan proposals.
For example, Morgan and Poulsen (2001) examine the impact on shareholder wealth from stockoption plan proposal announcements between 1992 and 1995. Thomas and Martin (2000) investigate the determinants of shareholder voting for stock-option plan proposals in 1998, focusing on plan characteristics and proposal dilution. Again, this research focuses on a limited set of proposals and does not examine the impact of broker votes on proposal passage.
II. Institutional and Regulatory Environment in Which Shareholder Voting Occurs
Here we describe certain features of the institutional and regulatory environment that may affect shareholder voting and proposal passage. Subsections A and B discuss several aspects of the proxy voting system, and Subsection C examines vote coordination among institutional investors.
A. Registered-and Beneficial-Owner Voting
Corporate state laws and regulations of the securities exchanges require that publicly held companies allow shareholders to vote on certain company matters. Shareholders generally vote at companies' annual meetings or at special shareholder meetings. Companies send proxy information directly to registered owners; that is, to shareholders who hold shares in their own names. These investors vote shares by returning proxy cards directly to companies or company tabulators.
Other shareholders, known as beneficial owners, hold shares through brokers and banks in street name. Because state laws recognize brokers and banks as the lawful owners of street name shares, brokers and banks, not beneficial owners, are eligible to vote them. To pass votes through to beneficial owners, companies send proxy materials and ballots for beneficially owned shares to brokers and banks, which then forward the materials and either signed, but unvoted proxy cards or voter instruction forms to beneficial owners. (See Dixon and Thomas (1998) for more detail.) Beneficial owners cast their votes by completing the proxy cards or by instructing brokers and banks how to vote the shares.
Street-name ownership increased from 20% of domestic issuers' shares traded on the NYSE in 1956 to between 70% and 80% in 1997 (Dixon and Thomas, 1998) . The causes of this increase are manifold. Shareholders, including dissidents and institutions that conduct business with issuers, increasingly prefer to hold shares in street names to protect the confidentiality of their identities, securities positions, and votes. At the same time, the brokerage community, which has less time to clear and settle securities transactions now than in the past, has incentives to encourage shareholders to hold securities in the street name. To do so and to cover the expense of issuing stock certificates, brokers routinely charge investors fees if they fail to hold shares in street name. For these reasons, activist investors, pension fund managers, financial institutions, and frequent traders are likely to hold securities in street name. The result is that street-name and registered ownership varies across firms depending on their investor bases.
B. Routine and Nonroutine Proposals
If beneficial owners fail to vote their shares or provide voting instructions to brokers and banks on routine management proposals, the NYSE and Amex permit member brokers and banks to vote the shares. In these cases, there is a broker vote, and it can be substantial. 
III. Factors Affecting Shareholder Voting
Shareholder voting is likely to depend on the types of issues that managers and shareholders include on ballots. We anticipate that voting turnout and the percentage of votes favorable to management will be higher when proposals are routine than when they are either nonroutine or submitted by shareholders. First, brokers are allowed to vote uninstructed shares for routine management proposals. Second, because routine proposals are likely to be less controversial than nonroutine management and shareholder proposals, they may generate votes favorable to management. In some instances we anticipate that proposal passage may be swung because of a "routine" rather than "nonroutine" classification.
Other factors may also affect voting turnout and votes favorable to management. For example, we expect that ISS recommendations unfavorable to management are likely to be associated with fewer votes cast in favor of management. In addition, we antic ipate the use of external proxy solicitation services to be related to shareholder voting. Managers retain external proxy solicitors to advise them on proxy issues, educate shareholders, and seek votes favorable to management. Although one might expect the use of external proxy solicitation services to result in higher voting turnout and votes favorable to management, we recognize managers may hire external proxy solicitors when they expect voting turnout or proposal passage to be problematic. That is, the use of solicitors may be associated with low turnout and few votes cast in support of management. Note that issuers, and therefore proxy solicitors, know the identities of registered owners because they hold shares directly. However, issuers may not know the identities of beneficial owners. Beneficial owners designate themselves as either nonobjecting or objecting. Nonobjecting beneficial owners are willing to have brokers share their identities with issuers and proxy solicitors, whereas objecting beneficial owners are not. Issuers and proxy solicitors must gather information from other sources about objecting beneficial owners.
Proposals' passage requirements may also affect voting results and passage. State securities laws broadly specify passage requirements, although firms may alter them by amending their bylaws and charters (Schneider, 1998) . However, for specific meetings, proposal passage requirements are largely predetermined and beyond managers' immediate control.
Passage is likely to be more difficult if a proposal requires a supermajority rather than majority of votes to pass and if passage depends on a percentage of eligible votes rather than votes cast.
Under a votes-eligible passage requirement, the percentage of votes cast in favor of a proposal is calculated as the number of votes cast for a proposal divided by eligible votes. The denominator is invariant to the number of votes cast. In contrast, under a votes-cast passage requirement, the percentage of votes cast in favor is calculated as the number of votes cast for a proposal divided by total votes cast. Thus, a given number of affirmative votes tends to result in a lower percentage of affirmatively cast votes if passage depends on eligible votes rather than votes cast.
Firm size and performance may also affect shareholder voting and results. Larger firms are more likely to receive shareholder proposals and expend resources hiring proxy solicitors than smaller firms. Poorly performing firms, which tend to be targeted by activist investors (Opler and Sokobin, 1999) , generally receive weaker shareholder support for management proposals and stronger support for shareholder proposals than more prosperous firms (Gillan and Starks, 2000) . Institutional investors typically have a fiduciary duty to vote shares and therefore do so (Del Guercio, 1996) . Company insiders, who have a vested interest in voting outcomes, are also likely to vote.
Voting support for management also should depend on the percentage of shares owned by large blockholders, institutions, and insiders. It is difficult, however, to predict definitively how owners of large blocks of shares will vote on proposals. Some empirical evidence suggests that blockholders act in concert with management (e.g., Dann and DeAngelo, 1988) . However, other research indicates that blockholders may pressure managers to change corporate policies, enhancing shareholder wealth (e.g., Barclay and Holderness, 1991; Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler, 1998; Holderness and Sheehan, 1985; Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985) . Regardless of how they vote, managers have, on average, incentives to include proposals only if they believe they will pass. We should therefore not observe many management proposals being included on ballots if management does not anticipate blockholder support. It is also difficult to predict how institutions will vote. Institutions historically have voted with managers. Increasingly, however, they are voting against them (e.g., Carleton, et al., 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2000) . Finally, we expect company insiders to vote with management. Thus, we expect a higher percentage of votes favorable to management when company insiders hold large blocks of shares than when their holdings are small.
IV. Company Characteristics
We focus on companies included in S&P's November 1997 Super-Composite 1,500 that had annual meetings during the 1998 proxy season. From this dataset, we exclude 20 foreign firms and 106 firms that either: 1) merged or were acquired before their 1998 meeting, 2) had a contested election of directors, 3) held a special meeting before their 1998 annual meeting or held only a special meeting in 1998, or 4) went bankrupt or were restructured. In Table I , we classify the remaining 1,374 firms according to whether their 1998 proxy statement included: 1)
only director election and/or auditor ratification proposals (537 firms); 2) director election, auditor ratification, and other management proposals (640 firms); 3) director election, auditor ratification, and shareholder proposals (92 firms); or 4) director election, auditor ratification, other management, and shareholder proposals (105 firms). We note that we were not able to locate information for all proposals. For example, 35 companies did not disclose voting results for 55 proposals, and we cannot determine passage requirements for three proposals. We base subsequent analyses on the set of firms and proposals for which all required information is available.
[ Table I about here] Table I reports the means of firms' financial characteristics and ownership structures, along with their use of proxy solicitors. (A full description of data items and sources appears in Appendix B.) We compare the characteristics of firms in each of the last three groups with firms in the first group; that is, firms that included only director election and/or auditor ratification proposals. The table shows the statistical significance of differences in distribution between the director election and auditor ratification group and the other proposal groups, using two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum or chi-squared tests. Table I indicates that firms that included director election, auditor ratification, and other management proposals in their proxy statements had higher market-to-book ratios, marketadjusted returns, industry-adjusted returns, and price/earnings ratios than firms with only director election and/or auditor ratification proposals. They had less debt in their capital structures, more share turnover, and larger insider holdings than firms with only director election and/or auditor ratification proposals. One interpretation of these findings is that ma nagers included proposals when performance was good and they anticipated shareholder support. Managers also appear to have been likely to include proposals when they had sufficient holdings to influence voting results and were likely to obtain a large broker vote for routine management proposals. Table I shows firms that had at least one shareholder proposal, but no management proposals other than director election and/or auditor ratification proposals in their proxy statements had larger market capitalizations, greater financial leverage, lower block ownership, and smaller insider holdings than firms with only director election and/or auditor ratification proposals. The table also indicates that firms that included director election, auditor ratification, other management, and shareholder proposals in their proxy statements had larger market capitalizations, higher market-adjusted returns, and lower block ownership than firms with only director election and/or auditor ratification proposals. The results in these columns show that firms that received shareholder proposals were larger, had lower blockholdings, and performed no worse than firms with only director election and/or auditor ratification proposals. The insider-holdings result is not surprising. One would expect noninsider shareholders to exert their influence through shareholder proposals when the chance of success is high and when the need to exert influence is large; that is, when managers have relatively few votes and when managers'
incentives are not aligned with other shareholders' because they do not own much stock. 
V. Results
In this section, we present analyses of the voting turnout and results. Subsection A discusses the results of the univariate analyses, and Subsection B presents findings of the multivariate analyses.
A. Univariate Voting Analyses
Here we present univariate analyses of the voting results. In Subsection 1, we outline the voting metrics used and report voting results. In Subsection 2, we study the impact of broker voting on voting turnout and results. In Subsection 3, we examine the impact of ISS recommendations on shareholder voting. To investigate potential harm to shareholders, we focus on swung proposals for which ISS recommended shareholders vote against.
Voting Metrics and Voting Results
The SEC requires companies to report "…votes cast for, against, abstentions and broker There are also many proposals to add shares to existing equity-based compensation plans.
Amendments to equity-based compensation plans generally take the form of changing participant eligibility, altering a plan's life or altering the level and timing of grants.
[ Table II about here]
Other categories of proposals include acquiring or being acquired, approving bonus plans, approving or repealing antitakeover-related measures (including poison pills, supermajority passage requirements, classified boards, dual-class stocks, preferred stocks, reincorporating firms, changing boards, and the like), changing company names, increasing authorized equity, undertaking legal restructurings, and certain other proposals. (The category "other" includes proposals such as the approval of technical charter amendments, board composition or size, and the amend ment of indemnification provisions.) We classify shareholder proposals as either corporate governance or social proposals.
Several results of Table II and Table III are important. First, Table II shows that brokers are able to vote beneficial owners' uninstructed shares on more than two-thirds (806 out of 1,173) of management proposals other than director elections and auditor ratifications, and do so on a wide range of issues. In 1998, brokers voted beneficially owned uninstructed shares for management proposals in seven of the 11 management proposal categories.
Voting turnout for routine management proposals, which ranges from 86.2% to 88.7%, is relatively high. Voting turnout for nonroutine proposals is somewhat lower, due, at least in part, to the exc lusion of broker nonvotes as actively voted shares.
Table III compares routine and nonroutine management proposals' voting turnouts and results by proposal type (when possible) by using Wilcoxon t-tests for differences in distribution.
The table indicates significant differences in voting turnout and results for different types of proposals conditioned on whether they were classified as routine or nonroutine.
[ Table III about here]
For virtually all proposal categories, companies' passage requirements enha nce the percentage of votes favorable to management, and potentially the passage of the proposal. Table II indicates that, on average, the percentage of votes cast favorable to management for routine management proposals would fall from 86.2% to 77% if passage was based on a percentage of eligible votes rather than on companies' passage requirements. Similarly, the percentage of votes cast favorable to management for nonroutine management proposals would fall from 78.2% to 63.8%.
The Impact of Broker Voting
The analyses in Table II and Table III Table IV reports a range of broker nonvotes and the number of proposals in each range. Over 70% of proposals have broker nonvotes greater than 10%, and 12.6% have broker nonvotes greater than 30%. Although brokers could not vote uninstructed shares for these proposals, the findings indicate the magnitude of broker votes that may be included in votes cast favorable to management on routine proposals.
[ Table IV or increase authorized common equity, three want approval of a by-law amendment to change board size, one seeks bonus-plan approval, one requests shareholder approval of a name change, and one asks for the approval of loans to officers. For proposals that seek to adopt or add shares to a stock-option plan, the average proposal dilution is 4.2% -below the 5% threshold required for nonroutine proposal classification. However, the average total dilution resulting from the proposals is 19.6% (with total dilution ranging from 7.2% to 34.6%). Of the 43 companies that proposed stock-option plans, 31 adopted or added shares to a stock-option plan at least once during the preceding three years. Of these, six companies had done so in each of the preceding three years, 11 had done so twice, and 14 had done so once. For the 21 proposals seeking to issue or increase authorized common equity, the median proposed increase is 200% of current shares outstanding. The proposed increases range from 25% to 212.5%. At a median increase of 200%, an investor's ownership stake would fall from 10% to as little as 3.3% if they owned 100
shares of a firm with 1,000 shares originally outstanding. From many shareholders' perspectives, these proposals could have significantly diluted their voting power and perhaps wealth.
In the sample, ISS recommended that investors vote against 78.1% (57) of the 73 proposals whose passage may have been swung by broker nonvotes. In contrast, ISS recommended voting against 25% of management proposals in the full sample, not including uncontested director elections and auditor ratifications.
In addition to analyzing the full sample of proposals, we study a subsample of proposals that want to adopt or add shares to stock-option plans. The finding discussed in Section II.B. that stock-option plan proposal dilution clusters below 5% suggests that managers may control the characteristics of stock-option plan proposals to capture broker votes. Studying these proposals'
voting results may help us determine the relation between managerial control of the proxy process and voting in a homogeneous sample of proposals whose characteristics may have been actively managed. Moreover, stock-option plan proposals, which can dilute share ownership, have attracted the attention of many institutional investors, and thus may face greater shareholder scrutiny than other proposals. 
ISS Recommendations and Potential Shareholder Harm from Broker Votes
Prior research indicates ownership structures that separate voting and cash-flow rights impose agency costs on shareholders (Bebchuk, et al., 2000; Horner, 1988; Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson, 1983; Megginson, 1990; Zingales, 1994) . Thus, shareholders of firms in which voting and cash-flow rights are dislocated because of broker votes are likely to incur such costs.
The market should discount shares' voting rights when brokers' votes are likely to be pivotal in elections and the private benefits to winning elections are significant (Zingales, 1995) .
Ideally, we would like to estimate the share discounts associated with broker votes.
However, Zingales (1995) notes that although voting rights should be priced, their values cannot be measured in publicly held firms that have single (as opposed to multiple) classes of equity.
We would also like to estimate the effect of broker votes on shareholder wealth, but to do so in an event-study context poses a number of problems. First, it is difficult to determine the appropriate event date. Possible dates include those of the proxy filing, the proxy mailing, the date on which ISS issued a voting recommendation, the date of the annual meeting, and the date on which the market knew the ownership structure of the firm and could ascertain the likelihood of proposal passage. It is also difficult to isolate the impact of specific information on share 
B. Multivariate Voting Analyses
In this section, we present multivariate analyses of the voting results. In Subsection 1, we provide an overview of the empirical approach. In Subsection 2, we study the impact of broker voting and ISS recommendations on voting turnout and shareholder voting.
Overview
The univariate results suggest that broker votes on routine proposals increased the votes cast favorable to management. Therefore, a central question is whether the institutional and regulatory environment affects voting turnout and results in a multivariate setting. In Table VI, we study the determinants of voting turnout, votes cast favorable to management as determined by companies' passage requirements, and votes cast favorable to management as a percentage of eligible votes. We do so for the full sample of proposals, and for a subsample of stock-option plan proposals.
[ Table VI about here]
Because voting turnout and results are bound by zero and one, we transform the voting metrics by using the transform log (% vote/(100-% vote)). Consistent with the discussion in Sections II and III, we model voting turnout and results as a function of the proposal and firm characteristics. We include total dilution as a covariate in the stock-option plan regressions, because we have anecdotal evidence that strongly suggests that shareholders focus on total rather than proposal dilution.
Multivariate Voting Results
The univariate analyses suggest that voting recommendations from ISS may affect shareholder voting and proposal passage. Table VI, Of course, ISS recommendations may be correlated with institutions' voting guidelines, and thus may be a proxy for institutions' interests. However, the analysis controls for dilution and other factors known to influence institutions' voting behavior. Therefore, the results suggest that ISS recommendations that are unfavorable to management may influence shareholder voting in and of themselves. The results are generally robust to a model specification including industry effects.
For proposals seeking additional shares for stock-option plans, we find statistically significant negative associations between both measures of votes cast and total dilution.
Shareholders voted against proposals they believed to be dilutive.
For both samples, Table VI shows negative and statistically significant relations between voting turnout and the presence of nonroutine management proposals. The same result holds for shareholder proposals in the full sample. These findings, which are consistent with the univariate results, capture the impact on voting turnout when brokers are not able to vote beneficial owners' uninstructed shares. The results could also reflect the possibility that nonroutine management and shareholder proposals tend to be more controversial than routine management proposals.
We find that passage requirements based on a percentage of eligible votes are negatively associated with the percentage of votes cast favorable to management based on the companyvoting rule. This finding is consistent with passage requirements of votes-eligible theoretically being associated with lower percentages of votes cast in favor of management. Supermajority passage requirements are not statistically related in any of the analyses.
We do not find statistically significant relations between voting turnout and firms' use of external proxy solicitors in either sample. However, Table VI shows that external proxy solicitation expense is negatively related to votes cast in favor of management based on the companies' passage requirements. As discussed earlier, managers may preferentially retain external proxy solicitors when they anticipate resistance from shareholders.
In both samples, firm size is positively associated with the percentage of votes cast favorable to management. Firm performance, which we measure by one-year market adjusted performance, is not related either to voting turnout or to votes cast favorable to management.
Share turnover is negatively associated with both vote turnout and votes cast in favor of management. It appears investors who sell their shares after a firm's record date and who therefore have voting rights but not cash-flow rights, lose interest in companies after they sell their shares.
We find that in both samples, block ownership is positively associated with the percentage of votes cast favorable to management and with voting turnout in the full sample.
This result indicates tha t owners of large blocks of shares act in concert with, or at least support, management. Not surprisingly, we find that insider ownership is positively associated with voting turnout and the percentage of votes cast favorable to management. However, institutional ownership is negatively associated with the percentage of votes cast favorable to management in both samples. This finding supports recent evidence of institutional activism, and Brickley, Lease, and Smith's (1994) finding that institutional shareholders vote against management, especially when investors perceive that shareholder wealth is at stake.
VI. Discussion and Conclusions
In this study we explore the balance of power between managers and shareholders in the proxy process, as delineated by firms' institutional and regulatory environment. In the sample, we find evidence suggesting that the institutional and regulatory environment may confer a votegetting advantage to managers. On average, routine management proposals have higher voting turnout and receive more votes cast favorable to management than do nonroutine proposals. The passage of as many as 73 routine proposals in 1998 may have been swung because they were classified as routine, rather than nonroutine, proposals.
Not surprisingly, we find that firm ownership structure affects voting results. An implication of these findings is that managers are likely to have incentives to alter the control rights of shares by changing their firms' institutional and regulatory environment. For example, the NASD recently filed a proposal that would codify its brokers' right to vote beneficial owners' uninstructed shares on routine matters. 11 Given the results in this study, we might expect that such a rule, if it changed brokers' behavior, would reduce the control rights of existing investors' shares and therefore would be supported by Nasdaq-listed firms.
Shareholders are also likely to have incentives to alter the control rights of shares through direct contact with firms and by lobbying to change regulatory policy. For example, shareholders have incentives to preclude managers from counting broker votes and abstentions in determining voting outcomes by submitting and passing shareholder proposals to that effect.
Shareholders might also want to endorse regulatory and institutional changes to enhance the control rights of shares. For example, in 1992 shareholders supported changes to SEC rules that enhanced shareholder communication and coordination of proposal submissions to firms. More recently, the CII asked the NYSE to revise its rules so as to preclude brokers from voting uninstructed shares altogether. To the extent that shareholders are successful in lobbying for regulatory change, they are able to enhance the control rights of shares.
Table I. Company Characteristics Classified by Types of Proposals Included in Proxy Statements
The table shows the means of firms' financial characteristics and ownership structures, and their use of proxy solicitors, classified by the types of proposals included in proxy statements. The sample consists of 1,374 firms from the November 1997 S&P Super-Composite 1,500 index. We measure the variables as of firms' fiscal year-ends before meetings. "MV" is equity market valuation. The "M/B" equals the ratio of the market value of a firm's equity to the net book value of its physical assets. "ROA" equals earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by net assets. "One-Year Market-Adjusted Performance" is a firm's one-year stock return net of the market's one-year return. "P/E" is the company's price divided by earnings per share. "One-Year Industry-Adjusted Performance" is a firm's one-year stock return net of its primary 2-digit SIC code industry one-year return. "Debt/Assets" is the debt-to-asset ratio. "Share Turnover" is the total shares traded between a firm's record and meeting dates as a proportion of primary shares outstanding. "Block Ownership" is the percentage of shares owned by investors that have bought at least 5% of a firm's outstanding common stock. "Insider Ownership" is the percentage of shares owned by a firm's officers, directors, or their families. "Institutional Ownership" is the percentage of shares owned by institutions. "Percentage Using an External Solicitor" indicates the percentage of companies that used external proxy solicitation services. "Solicitation Expense" is the mean amount spent by companies on solicitors, excluding solicitors' out-of-pocket expenses. Statistical comparisons of the director election and auditor ratification proposal group with the other proposal groups were carried out with two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum or chi-squared tests for differences in distribution. The samples consist of all proposals and all stock-option plan proposals for 1,374 firms from the November 1997 S&P Super-Composite 1,500 index. "ISS Recommendation" is one if ISS issued a recommendation unfavorable to management, and zero otherwise. "Total Dilution" is the total number of shares reserved for issuance, including shares authorized or issued if a proposal were adopted, divided by the firm's outstanding shares before authorization or issuance. The "Nonroutine Management Proposal Dummy" equals one if a proposal was nonroutine, and zero otherwise. The "Shareholder Proposal Dummy" equals one if shareholders submitted the proposal, and zero otherwise. The "Eligible Votes Dummy" equals one if the proposal passage depended on eligible votes, and zero otherwise. The "Supermajority Dummy" equals one if proposal passage depended on a supermajority of votes, and zero otherwise. "Solicitation Expense" is the amount spent by companies on proxy solicitors, excluding solicitors' out-of-pocket expenses. "MV" is equity market valuation. "One-Year Market-Adjusted Performance" is a firm's one-year stock return divided by the market's oneyear return. "Share Turnover" is the total shares traded between a firm's record and meeting dates as a proportion of primary shares outstanding. "Block Ownership" is the percentage of shares owned by investors that have bought at least 5% of a firm's outstanding common stock. "Insider Ownership" is the percentage of shares owned by a firm's officers, directors, or their families. "Institutional Ownership" is the percentage of shares owned by institutions. We obtain accounting and stock return data from Compustat for the fiscal year-end preceding each meeting date. ( ) indicates a p-value of whether a coefficient is different from zero.
[ Table Reported M/B Compustat "M/B" is the ratio of the market value of a firm's equity to the net book value of its physical assets.
ROA Compustat "ROA" is a firm's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by net assets.
1-Yr. Mkt.-Adj. Perf. Compustat "1-Yr Mkt.-Adj. Perf." is a firm's one-year stock return net of the market's one-year return.
P/E Compustat "P/E" is a firm's price divided by earnings per share.
D/A Compustat "D/A" is a firm's debt-to-asset ratio.
